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Abstrat: Although good enryption funtions are probabilisti, most symboli models do not apture this
aspet expliitly. A typial solution, reently used to prove the soundness of suh models with respet to
omputational ones, is to expliitly represent the dependeny of iphertexts on random oins as labels.
In order to make these label-based models useful, it seems natural to try to extend the underlying deision
proedures and the implementation of existing tools. In this paper we put forth a more pratial alternative
based on the following soundness theorem. We prove that for a large lass of seurity properties (that inludes
rather standard formulations for serey and authentiity properties), seurity of protools in the simpler model
implies seurity in the label-based model. Combined with the soundness result of (?) our theorem enables the
translation of seurity results in unlabeled symboli models to omputational seurity.
Key-words: Probabilisti enryption, seurity models, protool veriation, serey, authentiation
La modélisation du hirement probabiliste ne néessite pas une
représentation expliite de l'aléa
Résumé : Bien que de nombreuses fontions ryptographiques soient probabilistes, la plupart de modèles
symboliques ne prennent pas expliitement en ompte et aspet. Pour prouver la orretion de es modèles
par rapport aux modèles omputationnels, il est pourtant souvent néessaire de représenter expliitement l'aléa
utilisé dans le hirement, à l'aide par exemple d'étiquettes.
Il semble alors néessaire d'étendre les proédures de déision sous-jaentes et l'implémentation des outils
existants aux modèles basés sur des étiquettes. Dans et artile, nous proposons une alternative plus pratique,
basée sur le théorème de orretion suivant. Nous prouvons que, pour une grande lasse de propriétés de séurité
(omme les propriétés standards de seret et d'authentiation), la séurité de protooles dans un modèle sans
étiquettes implique la séurité dans les modèles ave étiquettes. En ombinaison ave le résultat de orretion
de (?), notre théorème permet de transférer les résultats de séurité des modèles symboliques sans étiquettes
vers la séurité omputationnelle.
Mots-lés : Chirement probabiliste, modèles de séurité, vériation des protooles, seret, authentiation
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1 INTRODUCTION
Designers of mathematial models for omputational systems need to nd appropriate trade-os between two
seemingly ontraditory requirements. Automati veriation (and thus usability) typially requires a high
level of abstration whereas predition auray requires a high level of details. >From this perspetive, the
use of symboli models for seurity analysis is partiularly deliate sine it seems that the inherent high level of
abstration at whih suh models operate is not able to apture all aspets that are relevant to seurity. This
paper is onerned with one partiular suh aspet, namely the use of randomization in the onstrution of
ryptosystems [Goldwasser and Miali, 1984℄.
A entral feature of the omputational, omplexity-based models is the ability to apture and reason expliitly
about the use of randomness. Moreover, randomness is essential to ahieve any meaningful notion of seurity
for enryption. In ontrast, symboli models rarely represent randomness diretly. For example, a typial
representation for the enryption of messagem under the publi key of entity B is the term {m}ek(B). Notie that
the symboli representation does not apture the dependeny on the randomness used to generate this iphertext.
While this abstration may be suiently aurate in ertain settings [Miianio and Warinshi, 2004℄, in some
other settings it is not suient.
Consider the following ow in some toy protool:
A → B : {m}ek(B), {{m}ek(B)}ek(B)
To implement this ow, eah ourrene of {m}ek(B) is mapped to a iphertext. Notie however that the
pitorial desription does not speify if the two ourrenes of {m}ek(B) are equal (reated with idential oins)
or dierent (reated with dierent oins). In rih enough protool speiation languages disambiguating
onstruts as above an be easily done. For instane, in a language that has expliit assignments, the two
dierent interpretation for the rst message of the protool an be obtained as
x := {m}ek(B); send(x, {x}ek(B)) and send({m}ek(B), {{m}ek(B)}ek(B))
Here, eah distint ourrene of {m}ek(B) is interpreted with dierent randomness. Other approahes adopt a
more diret solution and represent the randomness used for enryption
expliitly [Herzog, 2004, Abadi and Jürjens, 2001, Lowe, 2004, Cortier and Warinshi, 2005℄. If we write {m}lek(B)
for the enryption of m under the publi key of B with random oins l, the two dierent interpretations of the
ow are:
send({m}l1
ek(B), {{m}
l1
ek(B)}
l2
ek(B)) and send({m}
l1
ek(B), {{m}
l2
ek(B)}
l3
ek(B))
A model that employs labels to apture the randomness used in iphertexts (and signatures) has reently been
used to establish soundness of symboli analysis with respet to omputational
models [Cortier and Warinshi, 2005℄. Their results are based on an emulation lemma: for protool exeutions,
every omputational trae an be mapped to a valid symboli trae. The mapping is then used to translate
seurity properties that hold in the symboli model to omputational analogues. The next step towards making
the soundness result relevant to pratie is to arry out the seurity proofs using some (semi-)automated tools
for the symboli model.
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the popular tools (ProVerif [Blanhet, 2001℄,
CASPER [Lowe, 1997a℄, Athenta [Song, 1999℄, AVISPA [Armando et al., 2005℄), oers apabilities for auto-
matially reasoning in models that use labels. There are at least two solutions to this problem. One possibility
is to enhane the symboli models that underlie existing tools. Unfortunately suh a modiation would proba-
bly require signiant eort that involves adapting existing deision proedures, proving their orretness, and
verifying and modifying thousands of lines of ode.
In this paper we put forth and larify an alternative solution, used impliitly in [Cortier and Warinshi, 2005℄.
The idea is to keep existing tools unhanged, use their underlying (unlabeled) model to prove seurity properties,
and then show that the results are in fat meaningful for the model with labels. The main result of this paper
is to prove that for a large lass of seurity properties the approah that we propose is indeed feasible.
We are urrently implementing an AVISPA module for omputationally sound automati proofs based on
the results of this paper.
Results. We onsider the protool speiation language and the exeution model developed
in [Cortier and Warinshi, 2005℄. The language is for protools that use random nones, publi key enryp-
tion and digital signatures, and uses labels to model the randomness used by these primitives. To eah protool
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Π with labels, we naturally assoiate a protool Π obtained by erasing all labels, and extend the transformation
to exeution traes. To eah trae tr of Π we assoiate a trae tr obtained by erasing labels and we extend this
mapping to sets of traes. The rst ontribution of this paper is a proof that the transformation is sound. More
preisely we prove that if tr is a valid trae of Π (obtained by Dolev-Yao operations) then tr is a valid trae
of Π. Importantly, this result relies on the fat that the speiation language that we onsider does not allow
equality tests between iphertexts. We believe that a similar result holds for most (if not all) protool spei-
ation languages that satisfy the above ondition. The language for speifying protools (with and without
labels) as well as the relation between their assoiated exeution models are in Setion 2.
In Setion 3 we give two logis, Ll1 and L1, that we use to express seurity properties for protools with and
without labels, respetively. Informally, the formulas of L1 are obtained by removing the labels from formulas
of Ll1. Both logis are quite expressive. For example, it an be used to express standard formulations for serey
and authentiity properties.
Next we fous our attention on translating seurity properties between the two models. First, notie that
the mapping between the model with and that without labels is not faithful sine it looses information regarding
inequality of iphertexts. To formalize this intuition we give a protool Π and a formula φ suh that Π satises φ
(the formula that orresponds to φ in the model without labels), but for whih Π does not satisfy φ. Antiipating,
our example indiates that the soure of problems is that φ may ontain equality tests between iphertexts, and
suh tests may not be translated faithfully. The ounterexample is in Setion 4.
The main result of the paper is a soundness theorem. We show that for a large lass of seurity properties
it is possible to arry out the proof in the model without labels and infer seurity properties in the model with
labels. More preisely, we identify Ll2 and L2, fragments of L
l
1 and L1 respetively, suh that the following
theorem holds.
Consider an arbitrary protool Π and formula φ in Ll2. Let φ be a formula in L2 obtained by erasing the
labels that our in φ. Then, it holds that:
Π |= φ =⇒ Π |= φ
The logis Ll2 and L2 are still expressive enough to ontain the serey and authentiation formulas. The
theorem and its proof are in in Setion 4.
2 PROTOCOL
In this setion we provide the syntax of protools with labels. The presentation is adapted
from [Cortier and Warinshi, 2005℄. The speiation language is similar to the one of
Casrul [Rusinowith and Turuani, 2001℄; it allows parties to exhange messages built from identities and ran-
domly generated nones using publi key enryption and digital signatures. Protools that do not use labels
are obtained straightforwardly.
2.1 Syntax
Consider an algebrai signature Σ with the following sorts. A sort ID for agent identities, sorts SKey, VKey,
EKey, DKey ontaining keys for signing, verifying, enryption, and deryption respetively. The algebrai sig-
nature also ontains sorts Nonce, Label, Ciphertext, Signature and Pair for nones, labels, iphertexts, signatures
and pair, respetively. The sort Label is used in enryption and signatures to distinguish between dierent
enryption/signature of the same plaintext. The sort Term is a supersort ontaining all other sorts, exept SKey
and DKey. There are nine operations: the four operations ek, dk, sk, vk are dened on the sort ID and return
the enryption key, deryption key, signing key, and veriation key assoiated to the input identity. The two
operations ag and adv are dened on natural numbers and return labels. As explained in the introdution, the
labels are used to dierentiate between dierent enryptions (and signatures) of the same plaintext, reated by
the honest agents or the adversary. We distinguish between labels for agents and for the adversary sine they
do not use the same randomness. The other operations that we onsider are pairing, publi key enryption, and
signing.
We also onsider sets of sorted variables X = X.n∪X.a∪X.c∪X.s and Xl = X∪X.l. Here, X.n,X.a,X.c,X.s,X.l
are sets of variables of sort none, agent, iphertext, signature and labels, respetively. The sets of variables
X.a and X.n are as follows. If k ∈ N is some xed onstant representing the number of protool partiipants,
w.l.o.g. we x the set of agent variables to be X.a = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak}, and partition the set of none variables,
by the party that generates them. Formally: X.n = ∪A∈X.aXn(A) and Xn(A) = {X
j
A | j ∈ N}. This partition
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avoids to speify later, for eah role, whih variables stand for generated nones and whih variables stand for
expeted nones.
Labeled messages that are sent by partiipants are speied using terms in T l
L ::= X.l | ag(i) | adv(j)
T l ::= X | a | ek(a) | dk(a) | sk(a) | vk(a) | n(a, j, s) | 〈T l , T l〉 | {T l}L
ek(a) | [T
l]L
sk(a)
where i, j ∈ N, a ∈ ID, j, s ∈ N, a ∈ ID.
Unlabeled messages are speied similarly as terms in the algebra T dened by
T ::= X | a | ek(a) | dk(a) | sk(a) | vk(a) | n(a, j, s) | 〈T , T 〉 | {T }ek(a) | [T ]sk(a)
where a ∈ ID, j, s ∈ N, a ∈ ID.
A mapping · : T l → T from labeled to unlabeled terms is dened by removing the labels: {k}lm = {k}m,
[k]lm = [k]m, f(t1, . . . , tn) = f(t1, . . . , tn) otherwise. The mapping funtion is extended to sets of terms as
expeted.
The individual behavior of eah protool partiipant is dened by a role that desribes a sequene of message
reeptions/transmissions. A k-party protool is given by k suh roles.
Denition 1 (Labeled roles and protools) The set Rolesl of roles for labeled protool partiipants is de-
ned by Rolesl = (({init}∪T l)× (T l∪{stop}))∗. A k-party labeled protool is a mapping Π : [k]→ Rolesl, where
[k] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Unlabeled roles and protools are dened very similarly. The mapping funtion is extended from labeled
protools to unlabeled protools as expeted.
We assume that a protool speiation is suh that Π(j) = ((lj1, r
j
1), (l
j
2, r
j
2), . . .), the j'th role in the denition
of the protool being exeuted by player Aj . Eah sequene ((l1, r1), (l2, r2), . . .) ∈ Roles
l
speies the messages
to be sent/reeived by the party exeuting the role: at step i, the party expets to reeive a message onforming
to li and returns message ri. We wish to emphasize that terms l
j
i , r
j
i are not atual messages, but speify how
the message that is reeived and the message that is output should look like.
Example 1 The Needham-Shroeder-Lowe protool [Lowe, 1996℄ is speied as follows: there are two roles
Π(1) and Π(2) orresponding to the sender's and reeiver's role.
A→ B : {Na, A}ek(B)
B → A : {Na, Nb, B}ek(A)
A→ B : {Nb}ek(B)
Π(1) = (init, {X1A1 , A1}
ag(1)
ek(A2)
), ({X1A1 , X
1
A2
, A2}
L
ek(A1)
, {X1A2}
ag(1)
ek(A2)
)
Π(2) = ({X1A1 , A1}
L1
ek(A2)
, {X1A1, X
1
A2
, A2}
ag(1)
ek(A1)
), ({X1A2}
L2
ek(A2)
, stop)
Clearly, not all protools written using the syntax above are meaningful. In partiular, some protools
might be not exeutable. This is atually not relevant for our result (our theorem also holds for non exeutable
protools).
2.2 Exeution Model
We dene the exeution model only for labeled protools. The denition of the exeution model for unlabeled
protools is then straightforward.
If A is a variable or onstant of sort agent, we dene its knowledge by kn(A) = {dk(A), sk(A)}∪Xn(A), i.e.
an agent knows its seret deryption and signing key as well as the nones it generates during the exeution. The
formal exeution model is a state transition system. A global state of the system is given by (SId, f,H) where
H is a set of terms of T l representing the messages sent on the network and f maintains the loal states of all
session ids SId. We represent session ids as tuples of the form (n, j, (a1, a2, . . . , ak)) ∈ (N×N× ID
k), where n ∈ N
identies the session, a1, a2, . . . , ak are the identities of the parties that are involved in the session and j is the
index of the role that is exeuted in this session. Mathematially, f is a funtion f : SId → ([X → T l]×N×N),
where f(sid) = (σ, i, p) is the loal state of session sid. The funtion σ is a partial instantiation of the variables
ourring in role Π(i) and p ∈ N is the ontrol point of the program. Three transitions are allowed.
RR n° 5928
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m ∈ S
S ⊢l m
b ∈ X.a
S ⊢l b, ek(b), vk(b) Initial knowledge
S ⊢l m1 S ⊢
l m2
S ⊢l 〈m1 ,m2〉
S ⊢l 〈m1 ,m2〉
i ∈ {1, 2}
S ⊢l mi
Pairing and unpairing
S ⊢l ek(b) S ⊢l m
i ∈ N
S ⊢l {m}
adv(i)
ek(b)
S ⊢l {m}lek(b) S ⊢
l dk(b)
S ⊢l m
Enryption and deryption
S ⊢l sk(b) S ⊢l m
i ∈ N
S ⊢l [m]
adv(i)
sk(b)
S ⊢l [m]lsk(b)
S ⊢l m
Signature
Figure 1: Dedution rules.
 (SId, f,H)
corrupt(a1,...,al)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ (SId, f,∪1≤j≤lkn(aj) ∪ H). The adversary orrupts parties by outputting a
set of identities. He reeives in return the seret keys orresponding to the identities. It happens only
one at the beginning of the exeution.
 The adversary an initiate new sessions: (SId, f,H)
new(i,a1,...,ak)
−−−−−−−−−−→ (SId′, f ′, H ′) where H ′, f ′ and SId′ are
dened as follows. Let s = |SId|+ 1, be the session identier of the new session, where |SId| denotes the
ardinality of SId. H ′ is dened by H ′ = H and SId′ = SId ∪ {(s, i, (a1, . . . , ak))}. The funtion f
′
is
dened as follows.
 f ′(sid) = f(sid) for every sid ∈ SId.
 f ′(s, i, (a1, . . . , ak)) = (σ, i, 1) where σ is a partial funtion σ : X → T l and:
{
σ(Aj) = aj 1 ≤ j ≤ k
σ(XjAi) = n(ai, j, s) j ∈ N
We reall that the prinipal exeuting the role Π(i) is represented by Ai thus, in that role, every variable
of the form XjAi represents a none generated by Ai.
 The adversary an send messages: (SId, f,H)
send(sid,m)
−−−−−−−→ (SId, f ′, H ′) where sid ∈ SId, m ∈ T l, H ′,
and f ′ are dened as follows. We dene f ′(sid′) = f(sid′) for every sid′ 6= sid. We denote Π(j) =
((lj1, r
j
1), . . . , (l
j
kj
, rjkj )). f(sid) = (σ, j, p) for some σ, j, p. There are two ases.
 Either there exists a least general unier θ of m and ljpσ. Then f
′(sid) = (σ ∪ θ, j, p + 1) and
H ′ = H ∪ {rjpσθ}.
 Or we dene f ′(sid) = f(sid) and H ′ = H (the state remains unhanged).
If we denote by SID = N× N× IDk the set of all sessions ids, the set of symboli exeution traes is SymbTrl=
(SID×(SID→([X→T l]×N×N))×2T
l
)∗. The set of orresponding unlabeled symboli exeution traes is denoted
by SymbTr. The mapping funtion · is extended as follows: if tr = (SId0, f0, H0), . . . , (SIdn, fn, Hn) is a trae
of SymbTrl, tr = (SId0, f0, H0), . . . , (SIdn, fn, Hn) ∈ SymbTr where SIdi simply equal SIdi and fi : SID→ ([X→
T ]×N×N)) with fi(sid) = (σ, i, p) if fi(sid) = (σ, i, p) and σ(X) = σ(X).
The adversary interepts messages between honest partiipants and omputes new messages using the de-
dution relation ⊢l dened in Figure 1. Intuitively, S ⊢l m means that the adversary is able to ompute the
message m from the set of messages S. All dedution rules are rather standard with the exeption of the last
one: The last rule states that the adversary an reover the orresponding message out of a given signature.
This rule reets apabilities that do not ontradit the standard omputational seurity denition of digital
signatures, may potentially be available to omputational adversaries and are important for the soundness result
of [Cortier and Warinshi, 2005℄.
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Next, we sketh the exeution model for unlabeled protools. As above, the exeution is based on a dedution
relation ⊢ that aptures adversarial apabilities. The dedution rules that dene ⊢ are obtained from those of
⊢l (Figure 1) as follows. The sets of rules Initial knowledge and Pairing and unpairing in are kept unhanged
(replaing ⊢l by ⊢, of ourse). For enryption and signatures we suppress the labels adv(i) and l in the enryption
funtion {_}_
_
and the signature funtion [_]_
_
for rules Enryption and deryption and rules Signature. That
is, the rules for enryption are:
S ⊢ ek(b) S ⊢ m
S ⊢ {m}ek(b)
S ⊢ {m}ek(b) S ⊢ dk(b)
S ⊢ m
and those for signatures are:
S ⊢ sk(b) S ⊢ m
S ⊢ [m]sk(b)
S ⊢ [m]sk(b)
S ⊢ m
We use the dedution relations to haraterize the set of valid exeution traes. We say that the trae
(SId1, f1, H1), . . . , (SIdn, fn, Hn) is valid if the messages sent by the adversary an be omputed by Dolev-Yao
operations. More preisely, we require that in a valid trae whenever (SIdi, fi, Hi)
send(s,m)
−−−−−−−→ (SIdi+1, fi+1, Hi+1),
we have Hi ⊢l m. Given a protool Π, the set of valid symboli exeution traes is denoted by Exec(Π). The
set Exec(Π) of exeution traes in the model without labels is dened similarly. We thus require that every sent
message m′ satises Hi ⊢ m′.
Example 2 Playing with the Needham-Shroeder-Lowe protool desribed in Example 1, an adversary an or-
rupt an agent a3, start a new session for the seond role with players a1, a2 and send the message {n(a3, 1, 1), a1}
adv(1)
ek(a2)
to the player of the seond role. The orresponding valid trae exeution is:
(∅, f1, ∅)
corrupt(a3)
−−−−−−−−→ (∅, f1,kn(a3))
new(2,a1,a2)
−−−−−−−−→
({sid1}, f2,kn(a3))
send(sid1,{n3,a1}
adv(1)
ek(a2)
)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→(
{sid1}, f3,kn(a3) ∪ {{n3, n2, a2}
ag(1)
ek(a1)
}
)
,
where sid1 = (1, 2, (a1, a2)), n2 = n(a2, 1, 1), n3 = n(a3, 1, 1), and f2, f3 are dened as follows: f2(sid1) =
(σ1, 2, 1), f3(sid1) = (σ2, 2, 2) where σ1(A1) = a1, σ1(A2) = a2, σ1(X
1
A2
) = n2, and σ2 extends σ1 by σ2(X
1
A1
) =
n3 and σ2(L1) = adv(1).
2.3 Relating the labeled and unlabeled exeution models
First notie that by indution on the dedution rules, it an be easily shown that whenever a message is
deduible, then the orresponding unlabeled message is also deduible. Formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 S ⊢l m⇒ S ⊢ m
Note that our main result holds for any dedution rules provided this lemma holds.
Based on the above property we show that whenever a trae orresponds to an exeution of a protool, the
orresponding unlabeled trae orresponds also to an exeution of the orresponding unlabeled protool.
Lemma 2 tr ∈ Exec(Π) ⇒ tr ∈ Exec(Π).
Proof. The key argument is that only pattern mathing is performed in protools and when a term with labels
mathes some pattern, the unlabeled term mathes the orresponding unlabeled pattern. The proof is done by
indution on the length of the trae.
 Let tr = (SId0, f0, H0), where SId0 and H0 are empty sets. We have H0 = H0. f0 is dened nowhere,
and so is f0. Clearly, tr = (SId0, f0, H0) is in Exec(Π).
 Let tr ∈ Exec(Π), tr = e0, ..., en = (SId0, f0, H0), ..., (SIdn, fn, Hn), suh that tr ∈ Exec(Π). We have
to show that if tr′ = tr, (SIdn+1, fn+1, Hn+1) ∈ Exec(Π), then we have tr′ ∈ Exec(Π). There are three
possible operations.
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1. corrupt(a1, ..., ak). It means that tr = (SId0, f0, H0), (SId1, f1, H1). In this ase, we have SId1 =
SId0 = ∅, f1 = f0 andH1 = H0∪
⋃
1≤i≤k kn(ai). We an onlude that tr = (SId0, f0, H0), (SId1, f1, H1)
is in Exec(Π), beause there are no labels in H1 and f1 is still not dened.
2. new(i, a1, ..., ak). No labels are involved in this operation. The extension made to fn is the same as
is made to fn. Neither Hn nor Hn are modied. tr′ = tr, (SIdn+1, fn+1, Hn+1) is a valid trae.
3. send(s,m).
First, we have to be sure that if m an be dedued from Hn, then m an be dedued from Hn. This
is Lemma 1.
Note that SIdn = SIdn+1 thus SIdn = SIdn+1. Let fn(s) = (σ, i, p) and Π(i) = (..., (lp, rp), ...). We
have two ases.
 Either there is a substitution θ with m = lpσθ. Then fn+1(s) = (σ ∪ θ, i, p+ 1). Thus fn(s) =
(σ, i, p) and fn+1(s) = (σ ∪ θ, i, p + 1). By indution hypothesis, tr is a valid trae. From
m = lpσθ follows m = lpσθ. We onlude that tr, (SIdn+1, fn+1, Hn+1) = tr′ is a valid trae,
thus a member of Exec(Π).
 Or no substitution θ with m = lpσθ exists. Then tr
′ = e0, ..., en, en+1 with en = en+1. We
must show that it is always possible to onstrut a message m′ ∈ T , suh that there exists no
substitution θ′ with m′ = lpσθ
′
. Then, from the validity of tr′ and tr we an dedue the validity
of tr′, beause en = en+1.
Either there exists no substitution θ′ suh that m = lpσθ
′
. In that ase, we hoose m′ = m.
Or let θ′ be a substitution suh that m = lpσθ
′
. Then the mathing for m fails beause of labels.
This an be shown by ontradition. Assume m ontain no label, i. e. m does not ontain
subterms of the form {t}l
ek(ai)
or [t]l
sk(ai)
, t ∈ T . In that ase, we have m = m by denition.
>From m = lpσθ
′
, we dedue that m = lpσθ
′
, ontradition.
We dedue that m ontains some subterm of the form {t}ek(ai) or [t]sk(ai). The fat m = lpσθ
′
implies that lp has to ontain one of the following subterms: {t′}ek(Ai), [t
′]sk(Ai) with t
′ ∈ T or,
a variable of sort iphertext or signature.
Then, we hoosem′ = a for some agent identity a ∈ X.a. The term a is deduible from Hn. Now,
the mathing of m′ with lp always fails, either beause of the enryption or signature ourring
in lp or beause of type mismath for a variable of type iphertext or signature in lp.
3 A LOGIC FOR SECURITY PROPERTIES
In this setion we dene a logi for speifying seurity properties. We then show that the logi is quite expressive
and, in partiular, it an be used to speify rather standard serey and authentiity properties.
3.1 Preliminary denitions
To a trae tr = e1, ..., en = (SId1, f1, H1), ..., (SIdn, fn, Hn) ∈ SymbTr we assoiate its set of indies I(tr) =
{i | ei appears in the trae tr}.
We also dene the set of loal states LSi,p(tr) for role i at step p that appear in trae tr by LSi,p(tr) =
{(σ, i, p) | ∃s ∈ SIdk, k ∈ I(tr), suh that fk(s) = (σ, i, p)}.
We assume an innite set Sub of meta-variables for substitutions. We extend the term algebra to allow
substitution appliation. More formally, let T l
Sub
be the algebra dened by:
L ::= ς(xl) | ag(i) | adv(j)
T l
Sub
::= ς(x) | a | ek(a) | dk(a) | sk(a) | vk(a) | 〈T l
Sub
, T l
Sub
〉 | {T l
Sub
}Lek(a) | [T
l
Sub
]Lsk(a)
where xl ∈ X.l, ς ∈ Sub, i, j ∈ N, x ∈ X, a ∈ ID. The unlabeled algebra TSub is dened similarly. The mapping
funtion between the two algebras is dened by: ς(x) = ς(x), {k}lm = {k}m, [k]
l
m = [k]m, f(t1, . . . , tn) =
f(t1, . . . , tn) otherwise.
3.2 Seurity Logi
In this setion we desribe a logi for seurity properties. Besides standard propositional onnetors, the logi
has a prediate to speify honest agents, equality tests between terms, and existential and universal quantiers
over the loal states of agents.
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[[NC(tr, t)]] =


1 if t ∈ ID and t does not appear in a orrupt ation, i.e.
tr = e1, e2, ..., en and
∀a1, . . . , ak, s.t. e1
corrupt(a1,...,ak)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ e2, t 6= ai
0 otherwise
[[(t1 = t2)]] =
{
1 if t1 = t2 (syntati equality)
0 otherwise
[[¬F (tr)]] = ¬[[F (tr)]]
[[F1(tr) ∧ F2(tr)]] = [[F1(tr)]] ∧ [[F2(tr)]]
[[F1(tr) ∨ F2(tr)]] = [[F1(tr)]] ∨ [[F2(tr)]]
[[∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr)]] =
{
1 if ∀(θ, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr), we have [[F (tr)[θ/ς]]] = 1,
0 otherwise.
[[∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr)]] =
{
1 if ∃(θ, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr), s.t. [[F (tr)[θ/ς]]] = 1,
0 otherwise.
Figure 2: Interpretation.
Denition 2 The formulas of the logi Ll1 are dened as follows:
F (tr) ::= NC(tr, t1) | (t1 = t2) | ¬F (tr) | F (tr) ∧ F (tr) | F (tr) ∨ F (tr) |
∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr) | ∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr)
where tr is a parameter of the formula, i, p ∈ N, ς ∈ Sub, t1 and t2 are terms of T lSub. Note that formulas are
parametrized by a trae tr. As usual, we may use φ1 → φ2 as a shortut for ¬φ1 ∨ φ2.
We similarly dene the orresponding unlabeled logi L1: the tests (t1 = t2) are between unlabeled terms
t1, t2 over Tsub. The mapping funtion · is extended as expeted. In partiularNC(tr, t) = NC(tr, t), (t1 = t2) =
(t1 = t2), ∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr) = ∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr) and ∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr) = ∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr).
Here, the prediate NC(tr, t) of arity 2 is used to speify non orrupted agents. The quantiations
∀LSi,p(tr).ς and ∃LSi,p(tr).ς are over the loal states in the trae that orrespond to agent i at ontrol
point p. The semantis of our logi is dened for losed formula as shown in Figure 2.
Next we dene when a protool Π satises a formula φ ∈ Ll1. The denition for the unlabeled exeution
model is obtained straightforwardly. Informally, a protool Π satises φ if φ(tr) is true for all traes tr of Π.
Formally:
Denition 3 Let φ be a formula and Π be a protool. We say that Π satises seurity property φ, and write
Π |= φ if for any trae tr ∈ Exec(Π), [[φ(tr)]] = 1.
Abusing notation, we oasionally write φ for the set {tr | [[φ(tr)]] = 1}. Then, Π |= φ preisely when
Exec(Π) ⊆ φ.
3.3 Examples of seurity properties
In this setion we exemplify the use of the logi by speifying serey and authentiity properties.
3.3.1 A serey property
Let Π(1) and Π(2) be the sender's and reeiver's role of a two-party protool. To speify our serey property
we use a standard enoding. Namely, we add a third role to the protool, Π(3) = (X1A3 , stop), whih an be
seen as some sort of witness.
Informally, the denition of the serey property φs states that, for two non orrupted agents A1 and A2,
where A1 plays role Π(1) and A2 plays role Π(2), a third agent playing role Π(3) annot gain any knowledge
on none X1A1 sent by role Π(1).
φs(tr) = ∀LS1,1(tr).ς ∀LS3,2(tr).ς ′ [NC(tr, ς(A1)) ∧NC(tr, ς(A2)) → ¬(ς
′(X1A3) = ς(X
1
A2
))]
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3.3.2 An authentiation property
Consider a two role protool, suh that role 1 nishes its exeution after n steps and role 2 nishes its exeution
after p steps. For this kind of protools we give a variant of the week agreement property [Lowe, 1997b℄.
Informally, this property states that whenever an instantiation of role 2 nishes, there exists an instantiation
of role 1 that has nished and they agree on some value for some variable and they have indeed talked to eah
other. In our example we hoose this variable to be X1A1 . Note that we apture that some agent has nished
its exeution by quantifying appropriately over the loal states of that agent. More preisely, we quantify only
over the states where it indeed has nished its exeution.
φa(tr) = ∀LS2,p(tr).ς ∃LS1,n(tr).ς ′
[NC(tr, ς(A1)) ∧NC(tr, ς
′(A2))→ (ς(X
1
A1
) = ς ′(X1A1)) ∧ (ς(A2) = ς
′(A2)) ∧ (ς(A1) = ς
′(A1))]
Notie that although in its urrent version our logi is not powerful enough to speify stronger versions of
agreement (like injetive or bijetive agreement), it ould be appropriately extended to deal with this more
omplex forms of authentiation.
4 MAIN RESULT
Reall that our goal is to prove that Π |= φ ⇒ Π |= φ. However, as explained in the introdution this
property does not hold in general. The following example sheds some light on the reasons that ause the desired
impliation to fail.
Example 3 Consider the rst step of some protool where A sends a message to B where some part is intended
for some third agent.
A → B : {Na, {Na}ek(C), {Na}ek(C)}ek(B)
The speiation of the programs of A and B that orresponds to this rst step is as follows (in the denition
below C1A2 and C
2
A2
are variables of sort iphertext).
Π(1) = (init, {〈X1A1 , 〈{X
1
A1
}
ag(1)
ek(A3)
, {X1A1}
ag(2)
ek(A3)
〉〉}
ag(3)
ek(A2)
)
Π(2) = ({〈X1A1 , 〈C
1
A2
, C2A2〉〉}
L
ek(A2)
, stop)
We assume that A generates twie the message {Na}ek(C). Notie that we stop the exeution of B after it
reeives the rst message sine this is suient for our purpose, but its exeution might be ontinued to form
a more realisti example.
Consider the seurity property φ1 that states that if A and B agree on the none X
1
A1
then B should have
reeived twie the same iphertext.
φ1(tr) = ∀LS1,2(tr).ς ∀LS2,2(tr).ς ′
NC(tr, ς(A1)) ∧NC(tr, ς(A2)) ∧ (ς(X
1
A1
) = ς ′(X1A1)) → (ς
′(C1A2) = ς
′(C2A2))
This property learly does not hold for any normal exeution of the labeled protool sine A always sends
iphertexts with distint labels. Thus Π 6|= φ1.
On the other hand, one an show that we have Π |= φ1 in the unlabeled exeution model. Intuitively, this
holds beause if A and B are honest agents and agree on X1A1 , then the message reeived by B has been emitted
by A and thus should ontain idential iphertexts (after having removed their labels).
4.1 Logi Ll
2
The ounterexample above relies on the fat that two iphertexts that are equal in the model without labels
may have been derived from distint iphertexts in the model with labels. Hene, it may be the ase that
although t1 6= t2 ⇒ t1 6= t2, the ontrapositive impliation t1 = t2 ⇒ t1 = t2 does not hold, whih in turn
entails that formulas that ontain equality tests between iphertexts may be true in the model without labels,
but false in the model with labels. In this setion we identify a fragment of Ll1, whih we all L
l
2 where suh
tests are prohibited. Formally, we avoid equality tests between arbitrary terms by forbidding arbitrary negation
over formulas and allowing equality tests only between simple terms.
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Denition 4 A term t is said simple if t ∈ X.a ∪ X.n or t = a for some a ∈ ID or t = n(a, j, s) for some
a ∈ ID, j, s ∈ N.
An important observation is that for any simple term t it holds that t = t.
Denition 5 The formulas of the logi Ll2 are dened as follows:
F (tr) ::= NC(tr, t1) | ¬NC(tr, t1) | F (tr) ∧ F (tr) | F (tr) ∨ F (tr) | (t1 6= t2) | (u1 = u2) |
∀LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr) | ∃LSi,p(tr).ς F (tr),
where tr ∈ SymbTr is a parameter, i, p ∈ N, t1, t2 ∈ T lSub and u1, u2 are simple terms.
Sine simple terms also belong to T l
Sub
, both equality and inequality tests are allowed between simple terms.
The orresponding unlabeled logi L2 is dened as expeted. Note that Ll2 ⊂ L
l
1 and L2 ⊂ L1.
4.2 Theorem
Informally, our main theorem says that to verify if a protool satises some seurity formula φ in logi Ll2, it is
suient to verify that the unlabeled version of the protool satises φ.
Theorem 1 Let Π be a protool and φ ∈ Ll2, then Π |= φ⇒ Π |= φ.
Proof. Assume Π |= φ. We have to show that for any trae tr ∈ Exec(Π), [[φ(tr)]] = 1. >From lemma 2 it
follows that tr ∈ Exec(Π), thus [[φ(tr)]] = 1, sine Π |= φ. Thus, it is suient to show that [[φ(tr)]] ⇒ [[φ(tr)]].
The following lemma oers the desired property.
Lemma 3 Let φ(tr) ∈ Ll2 for some tr ∈ SymbTr, [[φ(tr)]] implies [[φ(tr)]].
Proof. The proof of the lemma is by indution on the struture of φ(tr).
 φ(tr) = NC(tr, t) or φ(tr) = ¬NC(tr, t). [[NC(tr, t)]] = 1, if and only if t ∈ ID and t does not our in a
corrupt event for the trae tr. This is equivalent to t ∈ ID and t does not our in a corrupt event for
the trae tr. Thus [[NC(tr, t)]] = 1 if and only if [[NC(tr, t)]] = [[NC(tr, t)]] = 1.
 φ(tr) = (t1 6= t2). We have that φ(tr) = (t1 6= t2) holds. Assume by ontradition that φ(tr) does not
hold, i.e t1 = t2. This implies t1 = t2, ontradition.
 φ(tr) = (u1 = u2) with u1, u2 simple terms. We have that φ(tr) = (u1 = u2) holds. Sine u1 and u2 are
simple terms, we have ui = ui, thus u1 = u2. We onlude that φ(tr) holds.
 The ases φ(tr) = φ1(tr) ∨ φ2(tr) or φ(tr) = φ1(tr) ∧ φ2(tr) are straightforward.
 φ(tr) = ∀LSi(tr).ς F (tr). If φ(tr) holds, this means that for all (θ, i, p)) ∈ LSi,p(tr), [[F (tr)[θ/ς]]] = 1.
Let (θ′, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr). We onsider [[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]]. Sine tr ∈ Exec(Π) implies tr ∈ Exec(Π) (Lemma 2),
we have (θ′, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr). By indution hypothesis, [[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]] = 1 implies that [[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]] = 1. It
follows that
∀(θ′, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr) [[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]] = 1.
Thus, φ(tr) holds.
 φ(tr) = ∃LSi(tr).ς F (tr). If φ(tr) holds, this means that there exists (θ, i, p)) ∈ LSi,p(tr), suh that
[[F (tr)[θ/ς]]] = 1.
By denition of the mapping funtion, there exists (θ′, i, p) ∈ LSi,p(tr) suh that θ′ = θ. By indution
hypothesis, [[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]] = 1. Thus there exists θ′, suh that [[F (tr)[θ′/ς]]] = 1. Thus, φ(tr) holds.
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5 DISCUSSION
We onlude with a brief disussion of two interesting aspets of our result. First, as mentioned in the introdu-
tion, the only property needed for our main theorem to hold is that the underlying dedution system satises
the ondition in Lemma 1, that is S ⊢l m ⇒ S ⊢ m. In fat, an interesting result would be to prove a more
abstrat and modular version of our theorem.
Seondly, a natural question is whether the onverse of our main theorem holds. We prove that this is not
the ase. More preisely, we show that there exists a protool Π and a property φ suh that Π |= φ but Π 6|= φ.
Let Π be the protool dened in Example 3. Consider a seurity property φ2 that states on the ontrary that
whenever A and B agree on the none X1A1 then B should have reeived two distint iphertexts. Formally:
φ2(tr) = ∀LS1,2(tr).ς ∀LS2,2(tr).ς ′
NC(tr, ς(A1)) ∧NC(tr, ς(A2)) ∧ (ς(X
1
A1
) = ς ′(X1A1)) → (ς
′(C1A2) 6= ς
′(C2A2))
where C1A2 and C
2
A2
are variables of sort iphertext.
This property learly does not hold for any honest exeution of the unlabeled protool sine A always sends
twie the same iphertext, and thus Π 6|= φ2. On the other hand however, one an show that this property holds
for labeled protools sine, if A and B are honest agents and agree on X1A1 , it means that the message reeived
by B has been emitted by A and thus ontains two distint iphertexts. Thus, Π |= φ2. We onlude that, in
general, Π |= φ does not imply Π |= φ.
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